L’Iran e la bomba, gerovital dei dittatori

Tratto da Aprileonline.info

Geopolitica Forse la leadership iraniana vuole davvero la bomba atomica. Il suo obiettivo però non è distruggere lo stato ebraico, ma preservare il loro dominio cleptocratico

Il 6 novembre il quotidiano britannico “Daily Mail” ha pubblicato un articolo dal titolo clamoroso: “L’Iran ‘potrebbe aver già collaudato testate nucleari avanzate’ “.
Forse Teheran vuole davvero la bomba atomica. Ma non per distruggere lo Stato di Israele, a dispetto dei farneticanti discorsi del presidente Ahmadinejad (che in mancanza di argomenti migliori eccita il suo rozzo elettorato con una bieca propaganda antisionista e negazionista). Teheran vuole la bomba atomica perché è un’assicurazione sulla vita.
Lo stesso Robert Gates, attuale segretario alla difesa statunitense, lo ha riconosciuto: “[gli iraniani] sono circondati da potenze con armi nucleari: il Pakistan a est, i russi a nord, gli israeliani a ovest e noi nel Golfo Persico”.
I leader iraniani sono terrorizzati, anche se non lo danno a vedere. Si ricordano benissimo che nel 2003, mentre al potere c’era il presidente riformista Khatami, gli americani hanno invaso l’Iraq con la scusa menzognera delle “armi di distruzione di massa” (WMD). E si ricordano anche che nei mesi precedenti all’invasione i neocon amavano dire a Bush che “chi ha davvero cojones non va a Baghdad, va a Teheran”. Inoltre sanno benissimo che forze di terra americane sono presenti in Iraq e soprattutto in Afghanistan (due paesi confinanti con l’Iran), e che Washington ha basi e strutture d’appoggio in Turchia, nel Golfo Persico e nell’Asia centrale.

Chiunque abbia mai giocato a Risiko o a un qualsiasi altro gioco di strategia sa che quando il tuo avversario circonda la tua provincia con tanti piccoli carri-armati verdi è il caso di iniziare a preoccuparsi.

I leader iraniani forse non hanno mai giocato a Risiko, ma senza dubbio sono molto preoccupati. Sanno che il popolo iraniano è stufo delle loro continue ruberie, della corruzione diffusa, dell’economia che non funziona. Le rivolte scatenate dalla contestata vittoria elettorale di Ahmadinejad a giugno hanno dimostrato quanto sia fragile il regime, che infatti vorrebbe spostare la capitale: non più Teheran, con i suoi coraggiosi giovani telefonino-muniti e la sua plebe indocile, ma una roccaforte blindata da qualche parte tra Qom e Delijan. Birmania docet: meglio Naypyidaw che Rangoon, meglio un imperscrutabile “gated community” governativa di una metropoli vivace e ribelle.

Ormai la teocrazia iraniana è una cleptocrazia conclamata in salsa nazional-religiosa: Rafsanjani, capo del Consiglio per il discernimento e presidente dell’Assemblea degli Esperti, è l’uomo più facoltoso dell’Iran; il generale Nurali Shushtari, ucciso nella recentissima “strage dei pasdaran” a Zahedan, era non solo un uomo di punta delle Guardie della Rivoluzione, ma un imprenditore ricco e potente; e persino la Guida Suprema Khamenei, ammalata di cancro, briga per lasciare il posto al suo secondogenito Mojtaba, che si è particolarmente distinto nella repressione delle rivolte.

I leader iraniani conoscono la storia patria, soprattutto il colpo di stato organizzato dalla CIA contro Mossadeq. E sono consapevoli che una grande rivolta popolare, sostenuta dalle intelligence angloamericane e dai media internazionali, potrebbe trascinarli per sempre nella polvere. Perderebbero tutto, i soldi e le donne come i privilegi e le immunità.

Conoscono il destino degli sconfitti: Saddam Hussein alla fine è stato processato e giustiziato; ma se avesse davvero avuto le famigerate WMD, probabilmente sarebbe ancora in uno dei suoi palazzoni kitsch, a ingozzarsi di hamburger e patatine fritte (il suo cibo preferito) e a ordinare omicidi.

In fondo Kim-Jong-il può governare indisturbato la Corea del Nord solo perché possiede qualche bomba atomica. E in Pakistan l’esercito è intoccabile perché controlla i silos nucleari.

La verità è che l’arma atomica è il Gerovital dei dittatori. Neanche il più guerrafondaio dei presidenti ordinerebbe di invadere l’Iran se le Guardie della Rivoluzione avessero qualche testata nucleare. Né si sognerebbe di sostenere una rivolta popolare, sapendo che un Iran nel caos vorrebbe dire un arsenale nucleare senza padrone, perdipiù in Medio Oriente.

In poche parole, forse l’Iran vuole davvero la bomba atomica, ma ciò non ha nulla a che fare con la distruzione di Israele. A Teheran sanno che lanciare una testata nucleare contro la periferia di Tel Aviv provocherebbe, come rappresaglia, la disintegrazione immediata dei maggiori centri urbani iraniani. Ma i leader iraniani non vogliono il martirio, quello lo lasciano volentieri ai kamikaze sunniti. Quello che vogliono è potere, sesso e denaro. Strano?

Why Italy Matters to People’s Republic of China (and vice versa, of course)

by Gabriele

It is common knowledge that the Chinese economy is driven by exports, which produce forty percent of the country’s total annual GDP. The nickname “Exportweltmeister” (World Exports Champion), Germany’s label for itself, will very soon also be appropriate to China. After all, the country known as “the world factory” is at the present time the third biggest national exporter, after the aforementioned Germany, and the United States.

China is Europe’s biggest source of manufactured imports, and the sixteen European countries that use the euro (including Germany, France and Italy), are a crucial market that is even more important than Japan or South Korea.
According to the European Commission, Europe’s imports from China grew by around twenty-one percent per annum from the period 2003 to 2007. In 2007 alone, the EU imported €231 billion (¥2,209 billion) worth of goods from China. Of course, Chinese goods can only be sold to the affluent European consumers (around 490 million people) if they are able to reach European shops and malls. This is why Italy is so relevant to Chinese prosperity.

At the present time, Chinese companies prefer using the efficient ports of Northern Europe, particularly the port of Rotterdam in the Netherlands. However, the distance between Rotterdam and the main Chinese ports is much farther than the distance between the Italian ports and China, and at present Chinese ships have to cross the whole Mediterranean Sea, past the Strait of Gibraltar, and then coasting Portugal, Spain, France and Belgium to reach their destination. More distance means not only more time, but also more fuel, more potential shipping hazards and, quite simply, more money.
As stated in a report by the Italian government, “Italian ports have the advantage of being reachable by the ships passing Suez Canal with seven days less than the ports of Northern Europe” .

Recently, Chinese COSCO, one of the largest shipping companies in the world, signed a deal with the Piraeus Port Authority, which controls the port of Athens (one of the most
important ports of the Eastern Mediterranean Sea). The deal concerned the thirty-five year concession of the port’s cargo facilities to COSCO. According to the Greek Prime Minister, Costas Karamanlis, “Greek ports can operate as transit centers for Chinese products to European Union states but also the broader area of southeastern Europe and the eastern Mediterranean” . Of course, Greece is adjacent to Turkey, a country of seventy-four million inhabitants that also has the potential for economic prosperity. However, Turkey has a GDP of $400 billion, less than the GDP of the tiny Netherlands, and its two biggest suppliers are Russia and Germany.

Moreover, the journey to Austria, the gate of European markets, from the port of Athens is longer than, for example, the journey from the port of Naples in South Italy (1600 kilometers and 950 kilometers respectively), and involves crossing deeply unstable countries with poor transit routes such as FYROM (Macedonia), Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. Additionally, as all these countries are not members of the European Union, Chinese goods from Athens must cross at least five borders before reaching their destination, and deal with all the incumbent bureaucracy arising from this. Moreover, Greece itself is an unstable country. Many experts fear that it could become “a centre of terrorism in Europe” , and this unrest is demonstrated by the fact that police often clash with political protesters. What’s more, the powerful Greek dockers’ union seem very unhappy about the deal with COSCO .

The Italian government, for its part, is particularly eager to make Italy the first European stop on a new “Silk Road” connecting China with Europe. What’s more, Italian ports already play an important role in the trade between the two powers: in the port of Naples, where COSCO operates, 1.6 million tons of Chinese goods enter every year. Additionally, Evergreen Marine Corporation is active in the port of Taranto (Southern Italy).

However, all this is not enough for either China or Italy, which really needs Chinese investments to boost its shaky economy (this year Italy’s GDP is projected to contract by 4.4 percent, and the Italian government is cash-stripped). The very important port of Gioia Tauro (Southern Italy), the center of a hub-and-spoke system encompassing Genoa (an industrial city in Northwestern Italy particularly close to France and Milan), La Spezia (Northwestern Italy) and Leghorn (Central Italy), has huge potential. Also, the port of Trieste (Northeastern Italy), once the largest port of the whole Mediterranean Sea, is just 160 kilometers from Austria.

Therefore, China should strengthen its import relationship with Italy for reasons that are both commercial, and also related to security. The Mediterranean Sea, which is very distant from Chinese shores, is a “Western lake” controlled by the Americans, the French and the Italians. Although it is true that Greece could also be a loyal partner to China, as the old saying goes, “don’t put all your eggs in one basket”.

- Pocket World in Figures (2009, The Economist).
- “Comparazione fra l’attrattività di alcuni porti italiani sulla rotta Europa-Cina connessa con la presenza di dotazioni materiali e immateriali nell’hinterland”, Ministero degli Esteri Italiano (June 30, 2004).
- “Hu Departs Greece with Key Port Deal in the Bag”, AFP Asian Edition (Nov 25, 2008).
- “Death Threat to Greek Media as Terrorists Plot Bomb Havoc”, The Observer, 22 February, 2009.
- “In Greece, China finds EU Trade Battering Ram: PM”, AFP Asian Edition (Nov 24, 2008).

Why Europeans Say “No” to Ankara

Many Europeans appear hostile to the accession of Turkey into the European Union. But the question is – why? One of the main reasons is the fear inspired by the echoes of the ancient past.
Take Italy, perhaps the most enthusiastic supporter of Turkey’s EU bid. Italians still use, albeit in a humorous way, an old expression: “Mamma li turchi!” (“My goodness, the Turks are coming!”). This expression originates from Medieval times, when the coast of Italy endured raids from Muslim pirates (at that time, all Muslims were seen, rightly or wrongly, as Turks).
Europeans are well-aware that Vienna was sieged by the Ottomans in 1529 and 1683. However, very few remember that after the First World War, European nations not only carved-up the Ottoman Empire (Iraq to Great Britain, Syria to France, etc.), but also tried to grasp pieces of Turkey itself. Only the determination of men like Kemal Atatürk and Inönü Ismet saved Turkey from Greek, French or Italian colonialism.
A second reason for the opposition to Turkey’s admission into the European Union is wariness. Turks are not Arabs, but despite this, many in the Old Continent still don’t consider them to be “real” Europeans. Even the French president Nicolas Sarkozy stated that Turkey is “not a European country”.
Perhaps wariness is originated by the fact that Turks are, in the main, not Christian but Muslim, and at the present time the European Union is, de facto, a (post) Christian “club”.
In fact, a “spectre” is haunting Europe – the spectre of Islamization. From Spain to Austria, Sweden to France, far-right European politicians are sounding the alarm about the imminent transformation of Europe into a “Muslim continent”, a panic that recalls the “yellow peril” hysteria of their American counterparts in the first half of the twentieth century.
Take, for example, Filip Dewinter, leader of Vlaams Belang, a right-wing party calling for the secession of Flanders from Belgium. He openly stresses the necessity of being “Islamophobic”, and last year warned that “Islamophobia is not merely a phenomena of unparalleled fear, but it is the duty of everyone who wants to safeguard Europe’s future. […] Europe is a continent of castles and cathedrals, not of mosques and minarets”.
Actually, some Europeans don’t support the accession of Turkey into the European Union for reasons other than racism or fear, but rather, because they are aware of current European weaknesses. For if the “no” sounded by a small country like the Republic of Ireland towards the Lisbon Treaty can seriously stall the European integration process, then what kind of delays could Turkey potentially cause? Europeans are aware that Turkey is a proud country, with a strong cultural identity and a great commitment to its national interests. If it was capable of saying “no” to its best friend the USA during the invasion of Iraq, then it is certainly capable of responding in the negative to certain aspects of the EU agenda.
Moreover, at the present time, the Turkish economy doesn’t appear to be in very good shape: this year, its GDP is projected to contract by 5.1% , unemployment is soaring, and several regions are officially considered to be economically deprived. Why should the countries of Eastern Europe (such as Lithuania or Hungary), who have themselves been severely hit by global recession, share European funds with Turkey?
For many Europeans, Turkey’s admission into the EU concerns them not just politically or economically, but also geopolitically. Turkey, with its status as a historical bridge between Europe and the Middle East, shares borders with unstable and authoritarian countries such as Iraq and Syria, to say nothing of Iran. Does the European Union really want to extend its borders to embrace this potentially explosive region of the world? In fact, many EU member states feel that Turkey’s current status is ideal, as due to its location, it serves as a convenient “cordon sanitaire”, a buffer-zone protecting Europe from the security threats of the Middle East.
However, for Turkish citizens, perhaps the question should be – does Turkey really need the European Union? Is the government of this proud state really ready to surrender a significant piece of its sovereignity to Brussels and Strasbourg? A solution to this impasse could be the proposal advanced by the German Chancellor Angela Merkel – a privileged partnership between Turkey and Europe, making Ankara the main ally of the European Union in the Middle East. After all, sometimes a good friendship is better than a bad marriage, and it certainly avoids the potential trauma of divorce.

Ukraine Has A Lot To Learn From Finland

autore: Gabriele

ecco la versione in lingua inglese del post EUROPA SÌ, NATO NO, pubblicata dall’American Institute in Ukraine (AIU) sul suo sito

http://www.aminuk.org

The facts are frightening. In 2009, Ukraine’s GDP is expected to decline by 8 percent. Iron and aluminium exports, pillars of the national economy, are in free fall, the banking system is on the brink of collapse, and like Iceland and Latvia, the government has already requested help from the International Monetary Fund. In a nutshell, Ukraine is collapsing.

With pretty schadenfreude, former president, Leonid Kuchma, has compared the situation of his unlucky country to the tragic scenario of 1941, when the Nazis occupied Kiev (according to legend, the city brings its occupiers bad luck, prompting superstitious Polish Marshall Jozef Piłsudski to steer well clear of it).

The tremendous global recession seems to have inflicted a fatal blown on both NATO and the European Union’s hopes for Ukraine, a country in the Russian orbit. However, it would be a great defeat for the European Union to lose the former Soviet country, because if it’s true that Kiev desperately needs Brussels, then it’s also true that Brussels needs Kiev.

Why? Simply put, Ukraine, with its 47 million inhabitants (projected to rise to 54 million in 2025), its agricultural and mineral wealth, and its geographically strategic position, could be very useful to the European economy, which is afflicted by an ageing working force and is lacking in abundant natural resources. Therefore, the European Union could well suffer from the loss of potentially the richest country in the the whole of Eastern Europe.

Historically, Ukraine has often been a tempting presence for European powers: everybody – from the Austrians to the Russians, the Germans to the Poles – has tried to gain control of the region, because whoever controls the vast Ukrainian plains controls the gates of Eurasia. The Hun hoardes and the Mongol armies who terrorized Europe in the Middle Ages knew this, as did the Nazis when they invaded the Soviet Union.

Of course, Europe can’t ignore Russia’s interest in Ukraine. If the Soviet Union had won the Cold War, and if Texas had become an independent state and adhered to the Warsaw Pact, what would have been the reaction of U.S. government? After all, we must remember that after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the Americans promised the Russians that NATO would not expand.

Even Jack F. Matlock, U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union between 1987 and 1991, stated that Gorbachev was given a “clear commitment that if Germany united, and stayed in NATO, the borders of NATO would not move eastward”.

Additionally, in April 2008, Vladimir Putin openly stated that “Ukraine is not even a state! What is Ukraine? Part of its territory is in Eastern Europe. On the other hand, we gave them the most important part of their country”. In other words, Europeans, Ukrainians and Russians must reach a compromise that is respectful of the will of the Ukrainian people, the worries of Russia and the needs of Europe.

It must be noted that most Ukrainians want their country to become a member of the European Union, like their neighbours Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania. Indeed, it seems that European aspirations unite Ukrainians of the Western regions and Russophones of the Eastern ones.

Through European funds, Kiev could modernize crumbling infrastructures and boost an economy that can’t depend solely on its iron, steel industries and chemical industries. Likewise, European institutions could strengthen the young democracy, thus stabilizing the whole country.

Regarding Ukraine’s NATO adhesion, the French, Germans and Italians are very cautious. After all, is it really necessary that Ukraine, a self-declared neutral country since 1990, should become a member of an alliance openly founded to “keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down”? If, during the short war between Georgia and Russia, the latter didn’t send its tanks to Tblisi, capital of a fragile country with just 4.6 million inhabitants, is it really feasible that there could be a Russian invasion of Ukraine, a country far bigger and stronger than Georgia?

Ukraine’s NATO adhesion would divide not only the Ukrainian people (deeply undermining local and regional stability), but also the Europeans, and would cause a serious strain in the relationship with Moscow, the main energy supplier of the Old Continent (and the biggest trade partner of Ukraine).

What is needed is a decent compromise, a “grand bargain” in the best European diplomatic tradition. Ukraine deserves the chance to enter the European Union, thus joining the world’s most successful community of prosperous and democratic counties. But, in order to respect Russian security and its own sovereignity, it should not join NATO.

Ukraine should learn from Finland, a rich, neutral democracy that has very good relations with its neighbour Russia. Because, as said by Ukrainian farmers, “if you chase two hares at the same time, you will catch neither of them”.

DEALING WITH THE PAST 2

autore: Ruggero

Dealing with the past:
how the judicial approach to constitutional continuity after a regime change may affect the interpretation of the rule of law.
An overview on two Eastern Europe countries: Hungary and Czech Republic.

3. Analyses of the decisions of the Courts

Both Czechoslovakian (and Czech) and Hungarian legislations were claimed to be inconsistent with the respective Constitutions, and were thus examined by the two Constitutional Courts.
But the outcoming decisions could have hardly been more different.

3.1
The Czechoslovakian Court upheld the 1991 “lustration” law as constitutional, but for one provision (that included even mere candidates to be secret informer in the range of application of the law). The decision was laid on two main grounds. First of all the Court argued that a State has the right to defend itself from the danger that could come by letting in place those people who were committed with the previous regime, and might be not loyal to the new one. Besides it would be unfair to let those people retain positions and privileges they obtained only for having been members or supporters of the Communist Party.
The second point was that provisions like those at judgment, which applied to a very vast range of professions, were justified by the current circumstances: the occurring transition from Communism to democracy required special measures to face the special issues that the transition itself raised.
The later Constitutional Court of Czech Republic upheld the amendments that extended the validity of the law, on the basis that even if the extraordinary circumstances were elapsed, the State still had the right to protect itself.
The decision of the Czechoslovakian Court, focusing on the necessity of special protection for the new democracy due its frailty in the first years after the transition, stresses the idea of a need for a total discontinuity between the two regimes. The fact that a new constitutional system took place, and that the old Communist Party no longer existed was not enough for the protection of democracy. The State had to be cleansed of those people who might be tempted to act to restore the old power or simply might not share the values of democracy.
Even if the sentence does not consider explicitly this point of view, it may be said the the Court approved the idea, embedded in the law, that the changed constitutional system required the discontinuity of the people holding key positions in State administrations.

The Hungarian Court acted a different role in the shaping of the “lustration” legislation. The first law, in 1994, provided for the inquiry of people holding certain roles in the public administrations, to be conducted by ad hoc panels, to discover which of them had been a collaborator of the old secret service or had been a member of the Arrow Cross Party. Those who happened to be recognized as having played these role could avoid the publication of this information by resigning from their job, but were free to keep it as there was no further sanction.
Notwithstanding this “light” features, the law was challenged before the Constitutional Court and dismissed as partially unconstitutional.
The Hungarian Court stated the opposite than what the Czechoslovakian did. It declared that, as the transition had already took place, there was no need of special protection for the democratic system. Thus it was not possible to act as to comply with extraordinary circumstances, and the law had to be consistent with the normal democratic principles. A “lustration” was still possible for people who held very critical position in the state organization, but only as emerged from the balancing of two rights: the general right to the revealing of informations of public interest on one side, and the right of self determination and privacy on the other.
So it was possible to conduct a certain screening among public persons, but it was necessary to allow every citizen to check his own files, and to provide protections for the personal data of the people who were spied (and the statute did not comply with this right, that concerned people’s right to privacy and self-determination).
The Court also stated some remarks about the too vast range of positions involved in the scrutiny.
The Parliament enacted a new law in 1996 that took account of the Court’s suggestions.
The Hungarian Court refused to apply the special circumstances theory in its examination of the law, because it stated that the transition was already over. Whatever discontinuity had there been between the Communist regime and democracy, that passage was in the past and no longer relevant. Where the Czechoslovakian Court used the “special times – special measures” rationale to upheld much stricter provisions, and even as a mean to promote some kind of material justice over the past happenings, the Hungarian Court kept a close observance of the “normal” democratic standards, showing its favor for the respect of the rule of law even in its formal aspects. We must recognize, however, that the Hungarian law was enacted some years later the fell of Communism, thus a need for protection of the democratic state was probably felt less compelling, whereas the Czechoslovakian rules were passed just in the immediate times after the transition. It is true that the Czech Constitutional Court upheld even the amendments that rendered those rules perennial, but the Court only had to stick to the precedent of the former Czechoslovakian Court.

3.2
As for the statute of limitation issue, the Czech Law on the Lawlessness of the Communist Regime and Resistance to It was challenged as well before the Constitutional Court .
The petitioners argued that the provisions contained in the Prologue and in the first part of the statute, that deemed the whole Communist regime during the years 1948 – 1989 as illegal, and declared the people who supported that regime responsible for the crimes committed by it, was unconstitutional, due to the following reasons. First of all a statute establishing by force of law that an entire historical period in a given country was illegal would have restricted further academic and historical investigations of that period, and thus would infringe the right of free research and the right of expression of personal opinions, which could be treated as illegal if departing from the statutory imposed vision of history.
Secondly it established a collective responsibility, and that was against the principle of personal liability in the criminal law.
Lastly the petitioners argued that the Czechoslovakian Republic (and then the successive Czech Republic) was the heir of the former Czechoslovakian Communist state: there had been a formal and substantial continuity between those two entities, in both domestic and international legislation. So it was not possible to claim the old Communist State as illegal at all.
At the same way, suspending the statute of limitation would have been against the respect of rule of law, which was one of the fundamental principles of the Czech Constitution, and that reviving criminal liabilities that had already expired would have infringed their personal rights and the certainty of law.
The Court rejected the first argument saying that the statute only provided a moral and political, rather then juridical, sentence about the Communist regime. It was a declaratory statement concerning the political will of the Parliament to consider the past events as unlawful and to act consequently. Thus it was an act of freedom of speech held by statutory means, and there was no reason to limit the right of free opinion and speech of the Parliament to non statutory acts. Besides it did not provide any sanction for the violation of this provision, reinforcing the view of its merely declaratory nature. So it did not restrain other people’s right of speech or research.
For the same reason it was not a mean to establish a joint criminal liability for past members or supporters of the Communist Party, because it did not provide any sanctions for those persons. It was only a mean to introduce a reflection on individual political responsibilities.
The reasoning of the Court became more sharp and complicate in the rejection of the third argument. The Court admitted that a formal continuity had took place, as the former legislation was receipted and the international obligations pending over the old state were assumed by the new one. But declared that legal continuity did not imply a continuity in values. The new Constitution was not neutral to values, and it required the application of the democratic values in the interpretation of the law. Thus the rule of law, the principle of legality, could not be intended as merely formal legality, it did not bind to the literal interpretation of the law; it was necessary to take account of the substantive purposes of the law as well.
Besides the Court argued that a democratic state was based on the principle of legitimacy, that means that to be legitimate a democracy had to be sustained by the majority of the population. As the Communist regime did not encounter the favor of the majority of the population, it was not legitimate. So the old legislation could not be considered as legitimate only because it already existed as positive law: legality was not a substitute for legitimacy.
For these reasons the Court refused to define the law as unconstitutional.
In relation to the part of the statute that suspended the statute of limitation, the petitioners founded their arguments mainly on the ground of legal certainty, stating that people whose liabilities were already expired could not see them revived. It was not their fault if they were not correctly prosecuted, and it was unfair to place on their shoulders the responsibilities of others, namely the old regime who did not do its job well.
The Court answered that, even if within the old regime legislation there were provisions proclaiming the respect of legality, the total unlawfulness of that regime made them dead letter. All State powers were run by the Party, and according its own, unwritten, rules, thus the positive law was completely disregarded. In such a situation there was no possible legal certainty. Those who committed criminal acts with a political motive were not relaying on the expiration of their liability within a certain period, they were relaying on the failure of the formal legal system of that time in punishing them. So it was not unfair to punish them, after having re-established a constitutional system truly respectful of the rule of law. Saying it with the words of the Court “it would be an infringement of the continuity of written law, if the violations of the law which were committed under the protection of the state could not be even now criminally prosecuted” . In this case the Court appealed directly to the formal continuity of law rationale.
The Court went further in its reasoning, arguing that the statute did not establish any new type of offence, other then those already provided in the old law, nor extended the original limitation period, that still remained of twenty years. Beside the criminal law stated that if due to the absence of the convicted person or due to legal impediment a regular trial could not have been held, the limitation period for a crime was suspended until the removal of these impediments. And that was exactly what happened during the Communism: some crimes were not submitted to regular trials due to the incapacity of the legal system to act consistently with its own provisions, and this incapacity was determined by the political will that held the power in those days. So there had been effective legal impediment. Thus the statute did not revive the liabilities for those crimes, because the limitation periods had not run properly. In this sense the statute was a declaratory provision, more then a constitutive one.
Finally the statute of limitation was not part of the procedural law, and not of the substantive criminal law. So the irretroactivity of the criminal law could not be claimed in such case.

As said before, the Hungarian so called Zetenyi – Takacs Act of 1991 stated that the limitation periods for crimes of treason and manslaughter, that were not prosecuted for political reason during the years from 1944 to 1990, were to be considered as not run. The law was similar to the Czech law, but it had a narrower field of application, as it referred only to the two nominated crimes.
The Court in its reasoning invoked the respect of the rule of law rationale, arguing that in a constitutional state the law had to comply with the text of the Constitution and with the values that the Constitution itself carried.
This premise seemed to resemble in some way the premise made by the Czech Court about the need of applying the law under the light of the constitutional values. But the outcome was utterly different: the Hungarian Court declared that the transition between the Communist regime and the democracy had took place under the basis of legality. So there was no reason to distinguish between laws enacted before or after the Constitution, nor to apply different standards in their interpretation. Thus the Court found the provision under examination not consistent with the principle of legal certainty, which was a corollary of the principle of the rule of law entrenched in the Constitution (a corollary that the Court itself had deduced from the constitutional text).
Besides the “political reasons” recalled in the statute as a requisite for the suspending effect taking place were too vague, to provide a sufficient clearness in the prediction of the application of the law.
Subsequent parliamentary acts on the same matter, an authoritative resolution and a modification of the Criminal Procedure Law, were equally challenged in front of the Court and declared unconstitutional .
Finally, in 1993, the legislature enacted a law with a narrower purpose, stating that war crimes and crimes against humanity were crimes under international law, and thus were not subject to statute of limitation.
With regards to this act the Court kept the general principle that extending the statutes of limitations was forbidden. But it recognized two exceptions, when there had not been a statute of limitations provision at the time the crime was committed, and when the crime was covered by international law, being a war crime or a crime against humanity. As Hungary was bound to the respect of international law by article 7 of the Constitution, and had signed the New York Convention, which did not provide for limitation periods for war crimes or crimes against humanity, it was possible to prosecute such crimes.
The Court only asked the Parliament to conform the statute to th international law notions of those crimes.
The Hungarian Constitutional Courts then kept a strict observance of formal legality; the only exception allowed was anyway based on the ground of legality, in that case on the ground of respecting international law as imposed by the Constitution.

AGGIORNAMENTI IN DIRETTA DA TEHERAN

fonte: Enrico

Per una copertura in diretta e gli aggiornamenti e il link riguardo alla rivolta in Iran, segui Enrico su Twitter. Lo trovi online all’indirizzo http://twitter.com/enricolabriola

Aggiornamenti hour-by-hour sulla situzione a Tehran
Grazie
EL

COLPO DI STATO A TEHERAN

autore: Enrico

Ricevo e inoltro da più di una fonte in Iran (scusate la schematicità, ma è quanto di meglio riesca per la chiarezza):

* Nella notte fra il 12 e il 13 Giugno, dopo un’affluenza record del 82% (considerata un forte segnale di una vittoria riformista), Mousavi all’ora di chiusura dei seggi convoca la stampa denunciando brogli (milioni di persone a cui è stato negato il diritto di voto, osservatori delle liste d’opposizione cacciati dai seggi, 7 milioni di schede in più stampate, irregolarità nelle commissioni elettorali). Nonostante questo, il 54% dei voti, secondo le proiezioni sono per lui. Pochi minuti dopo, una conferenza stampa convocata a sorpresa dalla commissione elettorale, dichiara che con una percentuale di schede scrutinate di oltre il 20% (ma molti seggi erano ancora aperti per votare), il 69% dei voti va ad Ahmadinejad, e solo una percentuale sotto il 30 a Mousavi. Nella notte, i supporter dei due candidati si confrontano nelle strade di Tehran, entrambi convinti di aver vinto. Mousavi ribadisce che ci sono state irregolarità e brogli, e che il risultato non è quello vero. Ahamdinejad accetta la vittoria e proclama di essere il presidente di tutti, liquidando le accuse come infondate (come fa il capo della Commissione Elettorale, dicendo che sarebbero considerate uno ’scherzo’ dagli iraniani). Ahamdinejad incassa anche l’appoggio della Guida Suprema Khamenei, che lo proclama vincitore e liquida le accuse di brogli.
* Scontri di piazza e proteste a Tehran contro l’esito delle elezioni proseguono da due giorni, facendo seguito alla richiesta di annullamento e di indagine da parte di Mousavi. Un poliziotto è stato salvato dal linciaggio dopo le violente repressioni e gli arresti di dimostranti. La tensione è palpabile e la polizia in assetto antisommossa ha sparato in aria per disperdere i manifestanti, ma ci sarebbe già il primo morto civile dovuto ad un colpo d’arma da fuoco. Anche i Pasdaran e i Basji (milizia di studenti islamici in borghese) hanno contribuito nel riportare l’ordine. I membri dell’opposizione denunciano anche la presenza di ‘provocatori’ in borghese che danno fuoco a esercizi commerciali e banche.
* I membri dell’opposizione hanno le case sorvegliate e molti sono stati arrestati preventivamente dalle autorità. La polizia ha fatto irruzione nella casa di Mustafà Tajzadeh, ex ministro degli interni e capo del fronte riformatore Musharekat, e l’ha arrestato. Anche lo stato maggiore del Musharekat è agli arresti, compreso il fratello di Khatami. Ora antrambi sembra siano stati rilasciati.
* La moglie di Mousavi al telefono pare aver confermato che la protesta continuerà su un piano pacifico. Forse martedì o mercoledì sarà proclamato uno sciopero generale contro il risultato delle elezioni.
* Un comizio di Mousavi con i suoi sostenitori a Tehran è stato vietato, e Mousavi ha rimandato la manifestazione, accogliendo l’invito di Khamenei ad ‘agire con calma, usando le vie legali’
* Alle troupe straniere è proibito filmare gli scontri (due giornalisti olandesi e alcuni spagnoli espulsi). I giornalisti tedeschi di ZDF e ARD sono guardati a vista da miliziani. Agli stranieri non vengono prolungati i visti per restare nel paese, e alle frontiere le procedure di transito sono molto insaprite.
* La BBC e altre reti estere riportano un oscuramento dei loro canali e delle radio estere in Iran, per limitare la diffusione di informazioni sulla rivolta.
* Oltre 170 oppositori sono stati incarcerati, considerati o implicati nelle proteste nel centro di Tehran o ‘ispiratori’ di esse.
* Mousavi è praticamente agli arresti, in quanto gli viene impedito di comunicare con attivisti politici. Solo poche telefonate sono permesse
* La polizia sta setacciando le case e gli ospedali in cui si crede vi siano membri dell’opposizione (in un ospedale ha anche aggredito il personale, lo riferisce il segretariato del Consiglio nazionale della resistenza in Iran). Lunedì mattina sono stati arrestati circa 200 familiari di giovani manifestanti incarcerati: si erano radunati davanti al tribunale rivoluzionario di Teheran per chiedere la loro liberazione.
* Il giornale di Mousavi, Kalameh Sabz, è stato messo al bando. Domenica la polizia, scrive il quotidiano riformista Sarmayeh, ha fatto irruzione nella sede del giornale, ha effettuato una perquisizione e sigillato l’edificio. Anche il giornale Velayat è stato costretto a sospendere la pubblicazione, e il giornale Asr Eghtesad era stato censurato già sabato mattina poiché prevedeva di titolare «Il verde della primavera prosegue», con riferimento al colore del partito di Mousavi.
* Da domenica è vietato l’accesso a YouTube, dove erano stati pubblicati filmati degli scontri a Teheran ripresi con i telefoni cellulari. Le linee per le interurbane e le connessioni internet vanno e vengono (ieri per quasi tutta la giornata Tehran era isolata telefonicamente) a causa del blocco alle comunicazioni.
* Da Tabriz, Ahwaz, Orumieh, Rasht, Isfahan giungono notizie di manifestazioni di massa per Mousavi, e nelle prime due i risultati sono apparsi subito palesemente incongruenti: Mousavi, di origine azera, è amatissimo nella zona a maggioranza azera del paese, che oltretutto è storicamente una zona riformista. I risultati ufficiali parziali parlerebbero anche qui di una vittoria di Ahamadinejad.

Un Golfo imbottigliato

autore: Enrico

Il Golfo Persico non vedeva tanto traffico di navi militari dai tempi di Iraqi Freedom, il nome affibiato dall’amministrazione Bush alla guerra del 2003. In quel caso però le navi che scorrazzavano nel Golfo erano solo quella della US Navy, ora invece le insegne che appaiono sulle fiancate non potrebbero essere più diverse. Il 27 Maggio sono attraccate al porto di Manama, sede della Quinta Flotta USA, alcune navi russe. Seguite poco dopo dall’arrivo nel porto di Salalah (Oman) da altre navi russe, presenti per la prima volta da decenni nel Golfo. Il loro arrivo è stato coordinato tra comandi navali Russi e comandi Iraniani. È la prima volta che una nave russa attracca e fa rifornimento nello stesso porto in cui fa base la marina statunitense. Mosca ha così inaugurato una presenza -non si sa se duratura o meno- della sua marina militare nel Golfo Persico. Contemporaneamente, Obama ha progressivamente ridotto la presenza della marina statunitense nel Golfo per aiutare la ripresa del dialogo con l’Iran, generando un’atmosfera positiva per i colloqui. Nel Golfo non è presente nemmeno una portaerei USA, come non accadeva da molti anni a questa parte. La mossa russa ha seguito di poco l’inaugurazione nel Golfo -il 25 Maggio- di una base militare navale francese, nei pressi di Abu Dhabi. Se anche i francesi, che hanno importanti interessi nell’area (Iran e Libano in primis), possono rompere il monopolio USA nelle acque del Golfo, perchè la Russia (impegnata diplomaticamente e finanziariamente soprattutto sul dossier Iraniano) non può stabilire una presenza in quelle acque? Sicuramente lo scenario resta nel complesso tranquillo, ma certamente l’attivismo delle grandi potenze intorno all’area del Golfo spiega quanto sia importante per molti essere presenti e contare in quella zona chiave del globo.

LIBERA STAMPA IN LIBERO (?) STATO

Autore: Enrico

Sembrava aver riaperto il quotidiano riformista ‘Yas No’, dopo 6 anni dalla sua prima chiusura, dovuta ad un articolo della minoranza parlamentare riformista in cui si criticava la posizione della Guida Suprema Ayatollah Khamenei riguardo alla non ammissione di molti candidati riformisti alle elezioni 2004. Ma non è durato nemmeno 2 giorni il sogno di Mohammad Naimipur, di sostenere il candidato riformista Mir-Hossein Mousavi attraverso le colonne del suo giornale. Il procuratore di Tehran Saeed Mortazavi, soprannominato il ‘macellaio della stampa’ ne ha ordinato la chiusura dopo un solo numero, colpendo duramente il campo riformista che ha visto decimati i suoi giornali a partire dal 1990 dallo stesso Mortazavi e che ha difficile accesso alle Tv, che in Iran sono tutte statali. I giornalisti, che si aspettavano prima o poi la chiusura, sono sorpresi della tempestività del provvedimento: forse -dicono- non è piaciuto l’articolo di apertura, intitolato ‘Khatami-Mousavi per l’Iran’. Mousavi sembra essere il principale avversario del presidente Mahmoud Ahmadinejad nelle elezioni del 12 Giugno. Molti osservatori stanno vedendo le avvisaglie di un irrigidimento dei conservatori per paura che in seguito all’elezione di un riformista cambi la struttura del potere in Iran. I riformisti che fanno capo a Khatami e all’ex premier Mousavi non hanno al momento alcuna pubblicazione permessa nelle edicole, al contrario dei conservatori che ne possono vantare decine. Alcuni rapporti parlano del lancio entro pochi giorni da parte dello stesso Mousavi di un suo giornale, ‘Kalameh Sabz’ (Mondo verde). Intanto il 17 maggio il ministro della Cultura ha esortato la stampa a promuovere l’attenzione e la mobilitazione sulle elezioni, ma ‘a fare attenzione a non rompere il orientamenti etici e culturali della società quando riportano notizie concernenti le elezioni’. Un criptico messaggio che potrebbe essere un avvertimento a chi tra i riformisti spera in una corsa priva di ostacoli.

Fonti

Eurasianet.org, Iranian reformist daily banned one day after relaunch, 17 May 2009

http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp051709.shtml

NABUCCO, OPERETTA OCCIDENTALE

Autore: Enrico

Quando la Russia spadroneggiava sui mercati mondiali di petrolio e gas, riempiendo le casse di Gazprom (e quindi gonfiando il bilancio statale) con utili record di un gas a oltre 480$ per 1000m3 e il petrolio che veleggiava sui 140$ al barile, il problema più grosso di Medvedev e Putin era come impiegare i soldi. Ora che il petrolio viaggia sotto i 60$ al barile e il gas che ha toccato i 240$, Gazprom, gli oligarchi russi e la leadership del Cremlino vedono franare i sogni di ricchezza e potere progettati sulle rive della Moscova. In un recente articolo del New York Times, viene sottolineato come la politica dei contratti di lungo termine ad un prezzo fissato sia ora estremamente deleteria per gli affari di Gazprom. I contratti prevedevano prezzi di favore (all’epoca) per gli stati dell’orbita russa ma ora che la domanda di gas è scesa, ogni barile o metro cubo non venduto a prezzo di mercato può provocare una perdita netta per la società statale monopolista dell’energia russa. Oltre tutto i prezzi del gas pagati ai fornitori da Gazprom sono circa a 340$ nel 2009, poiché determinati con una formula in cui entra anche il prezzo del petrolio di 6 mesi prima. A fronte di questi prezzi Gazprom ha contratti di lungo termine con l’Ucraina a 230$ e con l’Europa in media a 280$. Oltre tutto in molti casi gli adeguamenti infrastrutturali e gli investimenti promessi da Gazprom e finanziati a debito sono un peso devastante per la profittabilità e una rischiosa scommessa per le casse della società. I russi sono stati e sono tutt’ora molto gelosi del loro monopolio sulle forniture di gas all’Europa, e si sono a lungo opposti a progetti di pipeline alternative, che bypassassero il territorio russo: o blandendo gli stati coinvolti (fornitori o destinatari di gas) con faraonici progetti e incentivi economici, o minacciando di inasprire le relazioni e non supportando il governo ‘dissidente’. Ora una sequenza di eventi minaccia i piani monopolistici del Cremlino: l’8 aprile si sono riuniti a Praga nel Southern Corridor Summit alcuni stati coinvolti nel progetto Nabucco, una pipeline di 3.300 km che porterebbe il gas del Caspio attraverso Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turchia, Bulgaria, Romania, Ungheria fino all’affamato mercato europeo. Gli USA si sono spesi negli ultimi anni a favore del progetto (che aiuterebbe stati alleati come la Georgia e la Turchia con le royalties e le commesse per la costruzione del gasdotto) e indebolirebbe la posizione di Mosca in Asia Centrale, Asia e Medio Oriente. Anche l’UE è della partita, convinta che diversificare potrebbe risolvere i problemi geopolitici connessi al monopolio russo (ma non tutti gli stati membri sono fortemente a favore del progetto). L’Azerbaijan, che insieme alla Georgia, alla Turchia e all’Egitto (tutti alleati USA) ha firmato l’intesa praghese, l’estate scorsa (dopo la guerra in Georgia) stava valutando seriamente la proposta di Gazprom di vendere l’intera produzione di gas del paese: una decisione controversa che da una spinta decisiva al progetto. La notte del 9 Aprile una porzione del gasdotto che trasporta il gas dall’Asia Centrale alla Russia è esplosa in Turkmenistan (per cause non del tutto chiare). Le valvole verso la Russia erano ancora chiuse il 1° aprile e secondo diversi report il flusso non è ancora ripreso regolarmente. Ma l’incidente ha evidenziato la carenza di alternative per il gas Turkmeno: pochi giorni dopo l’incidente è stato firmato un accordo con la società tedesca RWE (che partecipa al consorzio Nabucco) per l’esplorazione e lo sfruttamento di una parte del Caspio Turkmeno. Se questo livello dei prezzi dovesse continuare, Gazprom potrebbe essere costretta a chiedere soldi al governo russo o al mercato per far fronte alle perdite previste nel 2009 e 2010.

Fonti:
The New York Times – Falling Gas Prices Deny Russia a Lever of Power, 18 May 2009

http://www.geotimes.ge/index.php?m=home&newsid=16549

EIA spot prices index

http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_spt_s1_d.htm

Charter97.org, “Gazprom”: In 2009 gas price for Belarus to be equal to $240 per thousand cubic metre, 15 Dec 2009 http://www.charter97.org/en/news/2008/12/15/13090/

APA, Southern Corridor Summit Declaration signed in Prague, 8 May 2009

http://en.apa.az/news.php?id=101907